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Stories on the positive and negative effects of globalization on workers in developing 
countries abound.  But a comprehensive picture is missing and many of the stories are 
ideologically charged.  This paper reviews the academic literature on the subject, 
including several studies currently under way, and derives the implications for public 
policy.  First, it deals with the effects of openness to trade, foreign direct investment and 
financial crises on average wages.  Second, it discusses the impact of exposure to world 
markets on the dispersion of wages by occupation, skill and gender.  Third, it describes 
the pattern of job destruction and job creation associated with globalization.  Because 
these two processes are not synchronized, the fourth issue addressed is the impact on 
unemployment rates.  Fifth, the paper reviews the labor market policies that can be used 
to offset the adverse impacts of globalization on employment and labor earnings.  Finally, 
it discusses how the international community could encourage developing countries to 
adopt sound labor market policies in the context of globalization. 
The author is grateful to Gordon Betcherman, Richard Freeman, Emanuela Galasso, Peter 
Lanjouw, Dorsati Madani, Remco Oostendorp and Tzafiris Tzannatos for inputs and 
comments, and to Manuel Felix for excellent research assistance.  The views in this paper 
are those of the author and should not be attributed to the World Bank. 
 
 1. Introduction 
  The labor market is one of the main channels through which globalization 
can affect developing countries.  Increased import penetration, export sales, competition 
in services, foreign direct investment and exchange rate fluctuations prompted by 
international capital movements could all, in principle, have an impact on employment 
and labor earnings.  A common concern is that “cheap” labor and the “race to the 
bottom” may be the flip side of globalization.  To become more competitive, countries 
may need to dismantle their trade barriers, abolish their legal monopolies, privatize their 
state-owned enterprises and reduce over-staffing in their bloated bureaucracies.  These 
reforms could lead to the massive loss of “good jobs” and boost unemployment rates.  
The macroeconomic fluctuations resulting from short-term capital movements could also 
increase job insecurity.  On the other hand, the delocalization of production to developing 
countries in sectors such as food processing, textiles or garments, could also increase the 
demand for labor, thus expanding employment opportunities and raising workers’ 
earnings.  New jobs in export industries might not be as good as the privileged jobs lost 
in protected sectors, but for the young women from rural areas who are hired in large 
numbers by those industries, they could be much better than the alternatives. 
Anecdotal evidence on all these positive and negative effects of globalization on 
the labor market abounds.  But a comprehensive picture is missing.  Lacking this picture, 
the policy debate has taken strong ideological biases, from all sides.  For some, all the 
fuzz about the negative impact of globalization on workers is just a disguise to support 
protectionism, and to introduce new obstacles to the free flow of goods, services and 
capital across countries.  Those who hold this view tend to downplay any adverse effects 
of openness on employment and wages.  For others, the adverse effects are large enough 
to justify an immediate policy response, under the form of additional labor market 
regulation and more generous social security programs, supplemented by sanctions for 
those countries that fail to comply.  This perspective often exaggerates the effectiveness 
of labor market interventions in developing countries, and minimizes some of the side 
effects of both domestic interventions and international sanctions.  Rigorous economic 
analysis and, more importantly, solid economic evidence, are the only way to defuse 
these ideological claims. 
A third view takes a different stance.  It sees wage earners as a privileged elite in 
most developing countries, where farmers and the self-employed account for most of the 
labor force.  From this perspective, whether this elite stands to lose from globalization 
should not be a concern, as long as the poor are better off.  But this view is questionable 
on both economic and political grounds.  From an economic perspective, the first-order 
effects of globalization on the labor market are probably those it has on salaried 
employment and wages.  If these effects are small, it is dubious that the poor will have 
much too gain from globalization.  From a political perspective, salaried workers in 
formerly protected activities or in the public sector are one of the social groups more able 
to articulate and convey its grievances.  Alienating this group may delay the opening up 
of the economy and the adoption of much needed economic reforms.  The key issue, 
therefore, is finding cost-effective ways to mitigate the adverse effects of globalization on 
salaried workers, while making it work for the poor. This paper proposes an analytical review of the evidence on the impact of 
globalization on employment and wages, including some preliminary results from work 
in progress.  This review does not always disentangle the effects of increased exposure to 
international trade from those of new technologies, or of capital flows across countries.  
But from the perspective of developing countries, trying to isolate those effects may be a 
bit specious.  Globalization is, precisely, the combination of all these changes in the way 
developing countries interact with the rest of the world.  Selling goods and services 
abroad often require the use of new, skill-biased technologies.  These technologies are in 
turn embodied in capital goods.  And the latter need to be imported from industrial 
countries.  The key issue, therefore, is not to identify which of the channels is the most 
relevant, but rather to assess the labor market impact of the overall package.  Moreover, 
globalization also puts pressure on the governments of developing countries to reform 
domestically, so as to make their economies more competitive.  Allowing competition in 
utilities, or privatizing state-owned enterprises are often part of the globalization 
“package”.  This review will also address the labor market impact of these reforms. 
The next section of the paper deals with the impact of openness to trade and foreign 
direct investment on wages.  The focus is on aggregate figures and the dynamics of the 
adjustment process.  Section three goes beyond the aggregates, and assesses whether 
globalization has a differential impact on workers depending on their occupation, 
educational attainment, or gender.  Section four reviews the effects of globalization on 
job destruction and job creation.  Because these two processes are not synchronized, an 
impact in unemployment rates is conceivable.  This impact is discussed in section five.  
The next two sections of the paper deal with the appropriate policy responses to 
globalization.  Section six reviews a variety of programs that have been used in 
developing countries to mitigate the impact of job losses and declines in earnings.   
Section seven discusses the role the international community should play in promoting a 
sound policy response to globalization in developing countries.  Section eight concludes. 
2. Average  Wages 
  According to the most popular model in international trade theory, globalization 
should equalize factor prices across countries.  Thanks to trade in goods and services, and 
to capital mobility, labor earnings should become similar in industrial and developing 
countries.  This convergence could take place even in the absence of any international 
migration.  If this is correct, globalization has to be beneficial to workers in developing 
countries. 
At a first glance, the abyssal differences in wage levels between say, Bangladesh 
and the US, cast doubts on the validity of this argument.  But several studies have shown 
that there is substantially more wage equalization across countries than suggested by the 
raw data.  Trefler (1993) analyzed the variance of wages measured in purchasing power 
parity across 33 countries, industrial and developing.  He found that 90 percent of the 
variance could be explained by differences in productivity.  This line of research was 
expanded by Freeman (1994), who considered 51 countries and relied on indirect 
productivity indicators, such as the average schooling of the population, and its 
urbanization rate.  According to Freeman’s results, a third of the variance in average 
wages in manufacturing could be ascribed to those indirect productivity indicators, and 
another third to differences in purchasing power parities.  Using a broader sample, Rodrik 
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manufacturing sector.  Rodrik also showed that the outcome depended on the political 
regime, as wages are higher (other things equal) in more democratic countries. 
  While these studies do not directly deal with globalization, they all suggest that its 
effect on wages should be positive.  To begin with, they all reveal that a strong 
association exists between wages and productivity at the country level.  It is generally 
accepted that productivity grows faster in more open economies (see, for instance, Sachs 
and Warner, 1995, and Sala-I-Martin, 1997).  Therefore, wages can be expected to grow 
faster too.  In addition, both Freeman and Rodrik include the ratio of foreign trade to 
GDP among the explanatory variables in their regressions.  The coefficient multiplying 
this ratio reflects the direct impact of openness on wages, not its indirect impact through 
productivity levels.  That coefficient turns out to be positive in all the specifications in 
both studies.  It is statistically insignificant in the study by Rodrik, but highly significant 
in the study by Freeman. 
  The hypothesis that wages grow faster in more open economies is supported by 
Figure 1, which was constructed using wage data from dozens of occupations in 70 
countries.  The wage data were originally collected by the International Labor Office 
through its October Survey, and subsequently standardized in a comparable format by 
Freeman and Oostendorp (2000).  The October Survey, conducted since 1924, has rarely 
been used for research purposes, because the raw data in it suffer from comparability 
problems.  Occupations (e.g. bricklayer, teacher, etc.) are defined quite precisely.  But 
depending on the country and occupation, the raw data may refer to wages or to earnings.  
The reported figure may be minimum, a maximum, an average, a median or other 
indicators.  Figures can also refer to men, women or both.  And the reference period can 
be the hour, the day, the week or the month, among others.  Freeman and Oostendorp re-
calibrated these data so as to make them comparable, by assuming a stable relationship 
between different wage measures.  The data used in Figure 1 correspond to the average 
monthly wages of men, in current US dollars. 
  The 70 countries considered in Figure 1 are classified in three groups, using the 
approach proposed by Dollar and Kraay (2001).  The first group, which is by far the 
largest, is made of countries that are not yet fully integrated with international markets.  
The two other groups, much smaller, are composed of industrial countries, which have 
been open for quite a long time, and of “recent” globalizers.  These groups comprise 14 
and 13 countries respectively.  Figure 1 reports the growth rate of the average wage 
between the 1980s and the 1990s, for the largest common set of occupations across all 70 
countries.  This growth rate is highest for the recent globalizers, and lowest for the non-
globalizers.  Therefore, the results reported in Figure 1 suggest that openness is good for 
workers. 
  A more disaggregated analysis reveals a more complex picture, however.  First, the 
growth rates depicted in Figure 1 are only relevant for those who do earn a wage, 
whereas globalization could in principle lead to substantial job losses.  The impact of 
globalization on job creation and job destruction will be addressed in section 4.  Second, 
these growth rates refer to average wages, but some workers may gain more than the 
average, while others may not do as well, or may even lose.  The differential impact of 
globalization across workers will be discussed in section 3.  And third, the growth rates in 
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temporary decline in wages.  The issue then is whether the present value of the gains 
from globalization is large enough to offset the short-term losses.  The rest of this section 
deals with the dynamics of wage adjustment. 
  Figures 2 and 3 summarize the impact of openness on wages over a five-year 
period.  These two figures were constructed based on a regression explaining the level of 
wages as a function of two openness indicators: the ratio of foreign trade to GDP and the 
ratio of foreign direct investment (FDI) to GDP.  In addition to these two indicators, the 
regression controls for country, occupation and year.  The wage data are, again, from 
Freeman and Oostendorp (2000).  The solid line in Figures 2 and 3 indicates the point 
estimate of the coefficient multiplying the openness indicator considered.  The dotted 
lines demarcate the 95 percent confidence interval for that coefficient. 
  Based on Figures 2 and 3, the short-term impact of trade liberalization on wages is 
negative, whereas the short-term impact of foreign direct investment is positive.  If the 
results in these figures are to be interpreted literally, an increase in foreign trade by 10 
percent of GDP leads to a 3.5 percent decline in wages.  An additional one percent of 
GDP in foreign investment, on the other hand, would raise wages by almost 2 percent.  
The combination of these two figures highlights the importance of the investment 
climate.  If the opening up of the economy fails to attract foreign capital, wage losses 
could be sizeable. 
  The short-term impacts revealed by Figures 2 and 3, estimated using aggregate 
data, are consistent with evidence from microeconomic studies.  Trade liberalization has 
been associated with declines in manufacturing sector wages in several developing 
countries.  In Mexico, a reduction in the license coverage of output from 90 percent to 10 
percent led to a 4 percent decline in wages measured at the plant-level; a reduction in the 
industry tariff from 50 percent to 10 percent led to a decline of almost 7 percent 
(Revenga, 1997).  In Morocco, a reduction in tariffs by 10 percentage points led to a 
decline in the wages of state-owned enterprises by almost 3 percent (Currie and Harrison, 
1997).  In Uruguay, trade liberalization did not reduce wages measured at the sector 
level, but it did not raise them either (Rama, 1994).  On the other hand, microeconomic 
studies dealing with foreign direct investment systematically report a positive impact on 
wages.  In Indonesia, foreign-owned firms pay more than locally-owned ones, after 
controlling for plant characteristics; moreover, higher foreign presence leads to higher 
wages in locally-owned firms (Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2001).  In Mexico and Venezuela, 
there is no evidence of a spillover on locally-owned firms; but wages are nevertheless 
higher in foreign-owned plants (Aitken et al., 1996). 
  While the impact of foreign direct investment on wages fades over time, the impact 
of openness to trade becomes significantly positive.  According to Figure 3, foreign direct 
investment has no significant effect on wages after five years.  If Figure 2 is to be 
interpreted literally, the negative effect of openness to trade on wages is offset after three 
years.  In practice, the precise timing of this reversal depends on the specification and the 
openness indicator used.  For instance, the change in the sign of the coefficient takes 
place in the fifth year when using the openness indicator constructed by Sachs and 
Warner (1995), instead of the trade-to-GDP ratio.  The indicator by Sachs and Warner 
combines the average tariff rate, the coverage of non-tariff barriers, the black market 
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exports, and the socialist nature of the economy. 
  The evidence reviewed so far refers to the effects of international trade and foreign 
direct investment on wages.  However, financial crises can have a substantial impact too.  
Using time series data from 67 crisis episodes, Diwan (2001) shows that the labor share 
of income falls, often dramatically.  In most cases the subsequent recovery is not total, 
implying that episodes of crisis bring a net loss to labor.  To the extent that international 
capital mobility makes financial crises more likely, the short-term losses from 
globalization could be much larger than suggested by the evidence on the effects of 
international trade.  For Diwan, the sheer magnitude of the losses is due to the fact that 
capital has become highly mobile, whereas labor is not.  Because the returns to capital 
cannot be adjusted downwards in times of crises, the entire burden of the adjustment falls 
on labor. 
3.  The Distribution of Wages 
On the surface, it may seem that globalization does not affect the wage distribution.  
Figure 4 reports a measure of the dispersion of wages by occupation, across different 
levels of openness to trade.  Each point in this figure corresponds to a country and year, 
over period 1983-1998.  The data on wages by occupation are, once more, from Freeman 
and Oostendorp (2000).  The dispersion measure used to construct this figure is the 
standard deviation of the log of wages, which measures the typical gap, in relative terms, 
between the wage in any of the occupations considered and the average wage.  If this gap 
is multiplied by one hundred, it can be interpreted as a percentage.  The higher the gap, 
the higher is wage inequality. 
According to figure 4, wage inequality across occupations does not increase with 
openness.  If anything, it could decline.  A more rigorous analysis, allowing for different 
levels of wage dispersion by country and year, fails to unveil any systematic impact of 
globalization.  Neither the ratio of trade to GDP, nor the openness indicator constructed 
by Sachs and Warner or the ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP have a statistically 
significant effect on the dispersion of wages by occupation (Rama, 2001b).  The results 
do not change when industrial countries are excluded from the analysis.  However, this 
apparent neutrality of globalization hides important changes along two dimensions: 
education and gender. 
  According to the most popular model in international trade theory, globalization 
should reduce the wage premium to education in developing countries.  In one of its 
simplest versions, this model considers two regions of the world and two factors of 
production: skilled and unskilled labor.  The two regions differ in their endowments.  
Skilled labor is abundant in industrial countries and scarce in developing countries.   
Globalization can be interpreted as a dramatic reduction in trade barriers and 
transportation costs.  As a result of this reduction, the two regions of the world face an 
incentive to shift their product mix in favor of the sector in which they do have a 
comparative advantage.  Thus, there is an increase in the demand for skilled labor in 
industrial countries, and an increase in the demand for unskilled labor in developing 
countries. 
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been used in the policy debate.  In its first comprehensive report on poverty, the World 
Bank (1990) claimed that labor-intensive growth was one of the main avenues to poverty 
alleviation.  Given that (unskilled) labor is the main asset of the poor, removing trade 
barriers and other market distortions was seen as one of the most effective ways to reduce 
poverty.  Wood (1994) used a similar argument to explain the diverging paths of 
continental Europe and the US.  According to Wood, globalization was pushing down the 
wages of the unskilled in both.  In the US, this trend could explain increased inequality.  
In continental Europe, where minimum wages and other labor market interventions were 
deliberately used to prevent the decline in the wages of the unskilled, the trend led to high 
unemployment rates. 
  But is this argument relevant in practice?  In industrial countries, most economists 
are skeptical.  Skill-biased technological change, as reflected in the introduction of 
computer technology in a variety of activities, is seen as a more likely candidate than 
globalization to explain the fate of unskilled workers.  The international trade theory 
argument requires a change in relative prices.  Goods produced with skilled labor should 
become cheaper in developing countries, and the same should happen to goods produced 
with unskilled labor in industrial countries.  This latter effect appears to be too small to 
explain the relative decline in the wages of unskilled workers.  Also, the international 
trade theory argument operates through a change in the structure of production between 
sectors.  But in the North, changes in the composition of employment towards skilled 
labor have occurred mainly through shifts within sectors, rather than between sectors. 
  In developing countries, several studies suggest that the wage premium to 
education has increased during periods of trade liberalization.  Robbins (1997) examined 
wages in Colombia’s seven principal cities over 1976-1994.  He claimed that growth in 
the supply of skills lowered, and trade liberalization and real devaluation raised, wage 
dispersion.  Robbins and Gindling (1999) present evidence that trade liberalization in 
Costa Rica led to an increase in the relative demand for more-skilled workers.  Green et 
al. (2000) examined the level and dispersion of wages, the skilled wage premium, and 
employment composition before and after trade liberalization in Brazil.  They found a 
rise in the returns to college education, and a decrease in the returns to intermediate levels 
of education.  Beyer et al. (1999) showed that a positive relationship existed between 
returns to education and openness in Chile, during 1960-1996.  In their paper, the 
earnings gap between college graduates and workers with primary education decreases 
with the share of the labor force that has college education, increases with openness and 
decreases with the relative price of tradable goods (more specifically, textiles). 
  One common difficulty in all these studies is to disentangle the effects of 
globalization from those of other shocks and policy reforms.  Behrman et al. (2000) 
address this difficulty by considering a variety of policy reform indicators across 18 Latin 
American countries over the period 1980-1998.  These indicators are also combined in a 
composite reform index.  Berman et al. find that reform overall has had a short-run 
disequalizing effect of expanding wage differentials, although this effect tends to fade 
away over time.  This disequalizing effect is due to the strong impact of domestic 
financial market reform, capital account liberalization and tax reform.  On the other hand, 
privatization contributed to narrowing wage differentials and trade openness had no 
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almost opposite results.  Reforms had a positive effects on real average wages, but a 
negative effect on the wages of less-schooled workers. 
  While all these studies could be subject to methodological criticism, taken together 
they cast doubts on the empirical relevance of the international trade argument or, at 
least, of its simplest version.  Several attempts have been made to reconcile the theory 
and the facts.  One of them, by Wood (1997), points out that most of the evidence on 
increased wage inequality comes from Latin America and, to some extent, Latin America 
may be suffering the same impact as industrial countries.  The most dramatic aspect of 
globalization in recent years has been the “China effect”.  Compared to Latin American 
countries, many developing countries in East Asia have large reserves of cheap unskilled 
labor.  The mass arrival of “made in China” products might have swept away the demand 
for unskilled labor in most of the region. 
Other studies question that the action was really driven by trade flows.  The 
international trade argument relies on a reallocation of production across sectors.  But 
studies focusing on sectors of activity, rather than on workers with different educational 
attainments, give little support to the reallocation hypothesis.  First, it is not at all clear 
that trade barriers were really protecting activities that rely on skilled labor.  For instance, 
Currie and Harrison (1997) found that protection in Morocco was significantly higher in 
sectors with a higher share of unskilled workers, such as textiles and clothing.  And 
Hanson and Harrison (1999) showed that the reduction in tariff protection resulting from 
Mexico’s sweeping 1985 trade reform disproportionately affected low-skill industries.  
Second, across a dozen “important” developing countries there is no clear trend in 
average wages across sectors, depending on whether they are export oriented or import 
competing (Ghose, 2000).  
  As in industrial countries, the focus has shifted to skill-biased technological 
change, rather than international trade.  Berman and Machin (2000) used data from 
manufacturing activities in both industrial and developing countries.  Instead of looking 
at the wages of export-oriented and import-substitution sectors, they considered the ratio 
of non-production to production wages.  Non-production workers are probably more 
skilled than production workers.  Therefore, this ratio can be interpreted as a skill 
premium.  Over two decades, Berman and Machin found a slightly upward trend in the 
ratio for industrial countries and a dramatically declining trend for developing countries, 
and especially for middle-income countries.  At a first glance, this result is consistent 
with the basic international trade model.  However, they also find that most of the 
changes occur within sectors, rather than across sectors.  Furthermore, the same sectors 
within manufacturing that substituted towards skilled labor in middle-income countries in 
the 1980s had been doing so in the US since the 1960s.  This pattern can be interpreted as 
evidence that skilled-biased technological change migrated from industrial to middle-
income countries. 
Another explanation relies on foreign direct investment and the resulting increase 
in the capital stock of developing countries.  Capital and skilled labor are likely to be 
complements in production.  The outsourcing of activities by multinationals from 
industrial countries is a major trend in recent years.  The resulting flow of capital may be 
small from the perspective of industrial countries, but it represents a huge addition from 
  7 the point of view of developing countries.  This higher capital stock should in turn lead to 
a higher demand for skilled labor.  Feenstra and Hanson (1997) analyze a panel of nine 
industries across Mexican states and conclude that outsourcing, under the form of 
maquiladoras, is associated with an increase in the share of non-production wages. 
A quasi-experiment on the effect of the overall globalization package is the 
dramatic transition experienced by formerly planned economies in recent years.   
Countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, as well as China and Vietnam, 
were suddenly confronted to the unleashing of market forces, openness to trade, and 
foreign direct investment.  The result was an increase in the returns to education, as 
shown by figure 5.  The observations in this figure are drawn from a variety of studies, 
using data sets with different coverage and relying on various econometric techniques.  
Consequently, the estimated returns may not be strictly comparable, not even within the 
same country.  However, there is an upward trend in all the countries considered.  In 
some of them, the implicit effect of the transition on wage inequality is remarkably large.  
For instance, if the estimates for the Czech Republic are taken literally, the wage gap 
between a college-educated person and a worker with primary education increased by 
roughly 60 percentage points in less than one decade. 
Transition economies represent an upper bound.  Their initial returns to education 
were abnormally low, due to the deliberate earnings compression pursued by socialist 
regimes.  For most developing countries confronting globalization, the initial wage 
inequality by skill is much higher.  Still, a more systematic analysis of the relationship 
between openness indicators and returns to education confirms that globalization does 
increase the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers, at least in the short run.  
Figure 6 shows the effect of increased openness on the wage premium to an additional 
year of schooling.  This effect is estimated using data from more than three hundred 
studies on the returns to education in developing countries.  Again, those studies use data 
sets with different coverage and do not necessarily rely on the same econometric 
approach.  But as long as the nature of the data and approach are not affected by 
openness, this diversity should not bias the results. 
The bars in Figure 6 indicate point estimates for this effect, based on regressions 
that allow for different returns by country and year.  These regressions include as the key 
explanatory variable an openness indicator, lagged one year.  For the bar on the left, this 
indicator is the ratio of trade to GDP; for the bar on the right, it is the ratio of foreign 
direct investment to GDP.  The estimated effects are sizeable.  An extra one percent of 
GDP in foreign direct investment raises the premium associated with an additional year 
of education by almost 0.8 percentage points.  This is equivalent to increasing the wage 
gap between a college-educated person and a worker with primary education by roughly 
10 percentage points.  Moreover, the estimated effects are statistically significant and 
their size does not change much if other control variables are added to the regression, or a 
contemporary openness indicator is considered. 
The impact of globalization on the wage premium to education is likely to be 
temporary.  Over time, it should be offset by an increase in the relative supply of 
educated workers.  The high wage premium for college educated workers provides an 
incentive to seek additional education.  As a result, the relationship between globalization 
and increased returns to skill should become weaker, or even vanish, in the longer run. 
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be more durable.  This gap can be measured as the difference in earnings between men 
and women that cannot be explained by their differences in educational attainment or 
work experience.  In Vietnam, at the beginning of the reform process, this gap was close 
to 39 percent in the private sector and 29 percent in state-owned enterprises.  Five years 
later, in 1997-98, it had shrank to 26 percent and 19 percent respectively (Rama, 2001a).  
A similar change was found in Mexico, in the context of trade liberalization.  Artecona 
and Cunningham (2001) showed that the gender gap in earnings declined more in sectors 
that were more exposed to foreign competition. 
This evidence is admittedly scattered.  But it is consistent with a non-competitive 
model of the labor market, where employers have some bargaining power to set wages 
and can therefore discriminate against women.  Globalization, and the reform efforts 
associated with it, increase competition in product markets.  This additional competitive 
pressure could reduce the scope for employers to set wages and discriminate against 
women. 
4.  Job Destruction and Job Creation 
  Looking at the average wage, or even at the wage distribution, is not enough to 
understand how globalization can affect individual workers.  Specific groups could 
experience large gains or losses due to globalization.  But if these groups are small, or if 
their movements up and down the ladder cancel each other, the impact on the average 
wage or the wage distribution may not be visible.  The more substantial the churning 
effects, the more likely that globalization will be resisted by the potential losers.  Job 
creation and job destruction are important mechanisms through which churning may 
occur.  But the very nature of some continuing jobs can also change in the process.  This 
is what happens when a worker ceases to be covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement, or when a permanent worker who enjoys all the perks and benefits extended 
by formal labor regulations is replaced by a temporary worker with limited rights. 
  A series of case studies on the effects of trade liberalization shows a considerable 
dispersion of the net impact on employment.  In some countries, net job losses were quite 
minimal.  In Morocco, for example, employment in the average private sector 
manufacturing firm was basically unaffected by trade liberalization (Currie and Harrison, 
1997).  The shift in labor demand was modest in Mexico as well (Revenga, 1997).  But in 
Uruguay, in a period in which trade union activities were banned, the decline was 
substantial. During that period, reducing the protection rate within a sector by one percent 
led of an employment reduction between 0.4 and 0.5 percent within the same year.  The 
employment effect became much smaller when trade union activities were allowed 
(Rama, 1994). 
  Small declines in employment may hide substantial job churning however.  The 
contrast between studies at the industry level and at the firm level is revealing in this 
respect.  Seddon and Wacziarg (2001) used industry-level data to examine the impact of 
trade liberalization episodes on movements of labor across sectors.  Their study found 
some labor reallocation between narrowly defined manufacturing activities.  But the 
estimated effects were statistically insignificant and small in magnitude.  On the other 
hand, Levinsohn (1999) used firm-level data to examine the pattern of job creation and 
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manufacturing fell by about 8 percent, in all years in this period about a quarter of all 
workers changed jobs. 
  Globalization also affected the nature of jobs in formerly protected sectors.  In 
Morocco, there were significant employment losses in specific groups of firms, which 
started to rely more on low-pay, temporary workers.  The share of temporary 
employment in manufacturing rose by nearly twenty percentage points between 1984 and 
1990.  In Mexico, trade reform reduced the rents available to be captured by firms and 
workers.  As a result, an average tariff reduction of 20 percentage points led to an implied 
wage reduction of more than 5 percent.  In Uruguay, trade liberalization was associated 
with lower wages in the period when trade unions were not active, despite the 
considerable reduction in employment.  In the period with active unions, the membership 
rate was strongly correlated with tariff barriers and concentration at the industry level.  
This correlation suggests that workers in protected sectors enjoy higher wages and better 
working conditions than their counterparts in sectors exposed to foreign competition. 
    Overall, these studies show that there was pervasive rent sharing between the 
protected enterprises and their workers.  The removal of trade barriers makes workers 
lose those rents, either because they lose their jobs altogether, or because the rent 
attached to their jobs becomes smaller.  This interpretation is consistent with the one 
offered for the effect of globalization on the gender gap in earnings.  In both cases, 
increased competition in product markets appears to reduce the size of labor market rents 
enjoyed by either employers or employees.  On the other hand, there is no strong 
evidence to support the claim that labor demand has become more elastic as a result of 
globalization (Chinoy et al., 1998; Maloney and Fajnzylber, 2000). 
  Another source of job destruction has been the downsizing of state-owned 
enterprises and government agencies.  The most dramatic retrenchment episodes took 
place in transition economies, where millions of workers needed to be reallocated to the 
private sector.  But all regions in the world have had their dose of downsizing in recent 
years (Haltiwanger and Singh, 1999; Kikeri, 1997).  In some cases, up to a half of the 
workforce in state-owned enterprises needs to be considered redundant, if those 
enterprises are to be run as private firms (Belser and Rama, 2001).  It could be argued 
that public sector downsizing is not directly connected to globalization, but the two are 
not independent either.  Countries that remain isolated from the outside world can keep 
their state sectors untouched for much longer. 
  Studies following public sector workers after retrenchment, or comparing their 
earnings and benefits to those of similar private sector workers, reveal a consistent 
pattern of losses from job separation (Rama, 1999).  Other things equal, the decline in 
earnings and benefits is smaller for more educated workers, and larger for those with 
more seniority in the public sector.  However, the total loss may not be as large for the 
latter, as they usually have fewer years of work before retirement.  Studies focused on 
welfare, rather than just earnings and benefits, also show larger losses for workers with 
more dependents.  Finally, women can also lose more than men.  They are not necessarily 
more likely to be targeted by downsizing programs, but they are more likely to 
experience a large drop in earnings.  The gender gap in earnings tends to be smaller in the 
public sector than out of it, implying a bigger loss, in relative terms, for separated 
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women, such as maternity leave, flexibility of hours and daycare facilities.  These 
benefits are more rare in the private sector, and generally unavailable in the informal 
sector, where most of the new jobs taken by separated workers are.  Not surprisingly, 
women are more likely than men to withdraw from the labor force after downsizing 
(Rama and MacIsaac, 1999). 
  Globalization has also led to substantial job creation, however.  The most visible 
part of this creation is associated with foreign direct investment and, particularly, with 
export-processing zones.  The latter are often defined as fenced-in industrial estates 
specializing in manufacturing for exports that offer free-trade conditions and a liberal 
regulatory environment.  But this definition is too restrictive.  In countries like China or 
Mauritius, firms are not geographically constrained in industrial estates.  In others, they 
are allowed to sell part of their output in the domestic market (Madani, 1999).  In theory, 
export-processing zones represent a sub-optimal mechanism to integrate a country with 
world markets, the optimum being to offer free-trade conditions and a liberal regulatory 
environment across the board.  In some countries, such as Sri Lanka, social and political 
constraints may prevent the complete removal of barriers and regulations in sectors with 
powerful vested interests.  In this case, export-processing zones can be seen as a way to 
reform “at the margin”.  In other countries, like China, special zones have been a way to 
experiment market-oriented reforms. 
  Regardless of their theoretical merits, export-processing zones have been a 
powerful engine of employment generation.  Figure 7 reports the share of the total labor 
force employed in these zones in selected countries during the 1990s.  The case of 
Mauritius is outstanding.  But the share is considerable in several of the other countries as 
well, especially when taking into account that agricultural activities and the informal 
sector still employ a considerable fraction of the labor force. 
  On the other hand, jobs in the export-processing zones are not as good as the 
“privileged” jobs in protected activities or in the public sector.  One of the features of 
these zones is their flexibility with labor laws.  In some countries, the flexibility is 
explicit.  For instance, prior to 1993 the Dominican Republic law did not impose the 
minimum wage on export-processing zones.  In other countries, the zones are not 
excluded from labor laws, but the latter are not enforced either.  Lax governmental 
supervision and opposition to labor unionization and union activities are common.  As a 
result, jobs in export-processing zones are less secure than formal sector jobs out of them.  
As regards wages and working conditions, they vary substantially depending on the size, 
nationality and corporate policy of the firm, the type of industrial production, labor 
market conditions and the country’s institutions and regulations. 
  Most of the jobs in export-processing zones are held by women.  In the Caribbean 
zones approximately 80 percent of the workforce is female, and the percentage is almost 
as high in the Philippines.  This female bias is especially strong in garment production.  
Several reasons have been advanced to explain why women, many young and single, are 
sought after as prospective employees.  Women are said to be more diligent and have 
more dexterity than men.  Also, the fact that most of them marry and leave after a few 
years implies that they tend not to get involved with trade unions.  Last but not least, 
women tend to be paid less than men.  Madani concludes that, despite their lower pay, 
  11 women might be the unintended beneficiaries from the formation of export-processing 
zones.  Many would have remained fully or partially employed in the informal sector, or 
stayed at home, were it not for them. 
  The pattern is similar in countries that have not relied massively on export-
processing zones, but where exporting firms have tapped local labor markets, attracting 
workers from the surrounding villages.  Industries such as textiles and electronics have 
massively hired young, literate, largely single women, who frequently ended up earning 
more than in traditional sectors, such as agriculture or cottage industries.  This female 
bias has been observed even out of the wage sector.  Evidence from Ghana and Uganda 
reveals that women had substantial economic mobility in response to economic reforms.  
In these two countries, rural women became increasingly engaged in non-farm 
employment activities, moving into the non-farm sector at faster rates than men (World 
Bank, 2001). 
  To the extent that globalization does translate into significant job creation in 
developing countries, the potential impact on poverty can be dramatic.  But this impact 
depends significantly on where the job creation occurs.  In China much of the impetus for 
the rapid economic growth during the 1980s came from a tremendous expansion of rural 
township and village enterprise activities.  These firms often emerged out of the 
community level structures which had been in place prior to the introduction of the 
household responsibility system in agriculture in the late 1970s, and typically became 
involved in labor-intensive export oriented manufacturing activities (Byrd and Lin, 
1990).  The inroads into rural poverty, which were achieved in China during this period, 
were nothing short of remarkable (World Bank, 2000b).  In other parts of the developing 
world a similarly strong negative relationship between poverty and the non-farm sector 
has been observed.  Even where non-farm employment opportunities accrue primarily to 
the relatively educated and skilled (and thus non-poor), benefits to the poor are often still 
discernable.  This is due to the relationship between the wage rates earned by agricultural 
laborers in rural areas, who are generally highly represented among the poor, and the 
tightening of rural labor markets, which generally accompanies an expanding non-farm 
sector (Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 2000). 
  On the other hand, there is a legitimate concern that participation in world markets 
may be associated with an increase in child labor.  The latter could have a detrimental 
effect on child welfare, both in the short term and in the longer term, though reduced 
schooling.  Policy reforms that promote labor-intensive production could therefore be a 
mixed blessing for the poor.  For example, a recent study of child labor in a city in 
western India concluded that: "The prevalence and absolute expansion of child labor in a 
period and region of relatively high growth of aggregate output indicates that the nature 
of economic growth is flawed" (Swaminathan, 1998, page 1526).  The argument merits 
closer scrutiny.  An important issue is whether sectors exposed to international 
competition tend to be more intensive in child labor.  Unfortunately, the evidence in this 
respect is scattered. 
  According to statistics assembled by the International Labour Office, about 70 
percent of the children who work are employed as unpaid family helpers in rural areas 
(Ashagrie, 1997).  Around 5 percent of all child workers could actually be employed in 
export industries.  A well-known example is the carpet industry in Uttar Pradesh.  An 
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the workers were less than 14 years old.  Children and adults perform the same job in 
these enterprises, with roughly the same productivity.  But children workers have lower 
wages.  Given how competitive the industry is, some argue that small loom owners would 
not be able to absorb the decrease in profits, were child labor banned.  Garment 
manufacturing in Bangladesh was another notorious example.  However, enterprises 
stopped employing children under 14 years of age due to a consumer boycott in industrial 
countries.  It is through the sex industry that globalization could have its most adverse 
impact on the children of developing countries.  Lower travel costs and better information 
networks may be associated with a growth in sexual tourism, including pedophilia.  The 
children affected may only represent a tiny fraction of all the children who work.  But the 
implications for their well-being are dramatic enough to warrant swift public action. 
5. Unemployment 
  While globalization prompts both job destruction and job creation, the timing of 
these two processes might not be synchronized.  During periods of trade liberalization, 
and more generally of economic reform, job destruction rates can be expected to proceed 
at a much faster pace than job creation.  Globalization could therefore be associated with 
higher unemployment rates.  Moreover, exposure to international markets could amplify 
macroeconomic fluctuations.  Terms-of-trade volatility and speculative capital flows 
could lead to booms and busts, increasing the variability of unemployment rates.  Even if 
the average unemployment rate remained unchanged over the business cycle, job 
turnover could increase, and with it the feeling of economic insecurity. 
  Before addressing the impact of globalization on unemployment, it is important to 
emphasize that the very concept of unemployment is somewhat ambiguous in many 
developing countries. According to the standard definition, an unemployed person is 
someone who would like to work at the prevailing wage rate, and is actively searching a 
job, but cannot find one.  This definition is problematic in countries where the salaried 
relationship is not prevalent, and employment in household enterprises and farms is 
common.  Assessing the willingness to work becomes difficult in this context.  Minor 
changes to the questionnaire of the survey instrument used to measure unemployment 
may dramatically affect the results.  Thus, in Jamaica the “unemployment rate” is roughly 
twice as high as the so-called “jobless rate”, the difference being due to allegedly 
discouraged job seekers.  Measuring employment is difficult as well.  For instance, it 
could be argued that someone spending a few hours a week as a street vendor, or helping 
in a farm or a household enterprise, is not really employed. 
  This ambiguity also has implications when it comes to understanding the 
determinants of unemployment.  In many developing countries, a large portion of the 
unemployed is made of educated, middle-class young adults who have not worked 
before.  Because their families can afford a protracted job search, these young adults can 
wait for a “privileged” job opening in the salaried, formal sector, and discard the 
available alternatives in the informal sector. 
Several studies have documented the importance of the gap between “privileged” 
jobs and other jobs as a determinant of unemployment in developing countries.  For Sri 
Lanka, Dickens and Lang (1995) were among the first to question the hypothesis that 
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they showed that there was no relationship between education and unemployment for 
urban youth and only a weak relationship for rural youth.  Even the latter relationship is 
brought into doubt when accounting for unemployment duration.  Typical unemployment 
spells last four years or more, and duration is not related to education.  Dickens and Lang 
concluded that more educated youth had higher unemployment rates simply because they 
have left school more recently.  For Egypt, Assaad (1997) examined the combined impact 
of the employment guarantee for graduates and public sector compensation policies on 
unemployment rates.  These policies encouraged queuing for government jobs, 
contributed to high graduate unemployment rates, and reduced the employment of 
graduates in the private sector.  Despite substantial wage erosion in the public sector in 
recent years, government wages, when appropriately corrected for worker heterogeneity, 
were on par with, or higher than, private sector wages, especially for graduates. 
  To the extent that globalization erodes labor market rents, the incentive to wait for 
“privileged” jobs, rather than taking readily available ones, could be reduced.  However, 
this might be a long-term effect.  In the short term, there is evidence that unemployment 
can go up, some times substantially. 
  Figure 8 reports the unemployment rates of four successful globalizers during the 
first two decades of their reform process.  The countries are Chile, Mauritius, Poland and 
Sri Lanka.  Each of them can be considered a model in its own region.  Needless to say, 
economic policies were not always ideal in all of them.  Chile had a failed experience of 
exchange-rate based stabilization, leading to a massive financial crisis.  Mauritius relied 
on an export-processing zone regime that is not, theoretically, the most efficient way to 
integrate with the rest of the world.  Poland and Sri Lanka maintained their protection of 
bloated and inefficient industries and state-owned enterprises.  Still, on average the 
economic management of these countries is probably close to the best that can 
realistically be expected. 
  All four successful globalizers have in common a long period of high 
unemployment rates after the launching of the economic reforms.  The precise year 
chosen to draw figure 8 is, admittedly, subject to controversy.  For Chile and Poland, the 
year one in the figure is the end of the socialist regime, even if many important reforms 
happened subsequently.  For Sri Lanka, the year one is 1977, when a large trade 
liberalization process was launched.  For Mauritius, it is 1970, when the export-
processing zone regime was introduced.  Other dates would be defensible as well.  When 
the initial year of the reforms is modified, it becomes unclear whether globalization 
actually led to higher unemployment rates.  However, the conclusion that high 
unemployment rates failed to decline for a long time seems robust. 
  Two developing regions are missing in figure 8, despite the fact that they both have 
successful globalizers in their ranks.  East Asia and the Pacific is the region with the best 
record in this respect.  But in all its successful globalizers unemployment rates remained 
very low for decades, until the crisis of the late 1990s.  The Middle East and North Africa 
region, on the other hand, does not include many success stories.  While Tunisia is one of 
them, a high and stable unemployment rate is one of the few weak points in its otherwise 
remarkable performance.  However, the case of Tunisia is more in accordance with figure 
8 than its stubbornly high unemployment rate suggests.  This is because the survey 
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use comparable questions to assess the willingness to work.  An assessment of 
comparable estimates actually reveals a steady, if slow, decline in the unemployment rate 
since the 1980s (Rama, 1998). 
  In the long run, open economies do not appear to have higher unemployment rates, 
as shown by figure 9.  If anything, their unemployment rates are lower.  The 
comparability issues raised at the beginning of this section could cast doubts on the 
interpretation of this figure.  But to the extent that country- and period-specific biases are 
independent from the degree of openness of the economy, the pattern described by the 
figure should be basically correct.  This pattern is one of high dispersion of 
unemployment rates in more closed economies, and convergence towards a relatively 
narrow range in more open economies. 
  Other studies reach a similar conclusion.  In Latin America, during two decades of 
increased exposure to foreign trade and international capital movements there was only a 
mild upward trend in unemployment rates.  The increase was dramatic in a few countries, 
such as Argentina, Colombia or Paraguay.  But the median rate grew by only one 
percentage point (World Bank, 2000a).  This relative stability is in contrast with the 
popular perception, as reflected in opinion polls.  Risk of unemployment ranks as one of 
the main concerns voiced by those surveyed, in most of the region.  Another interesting 
puzzle is that many of those who became unemployed in recent years used to work in the 
informal sector of the economy and, therefore, were not directly exposed to import 
competition or exchange rate fluctuations (Arango and Maloney, 2000). 
 6.  How to Mitigate the Costs 
  As globalization can create losers, and not just winners, it is important to identify 
what, if anything, can be done do to mitigate the impact of economic reforms aimed at 
integrating the economy more closely to the rest of the world.  A large array of 
government interventions has been tried in the developing world, and the lessons learned 
in one country could prove useful in others.  Some of these interventions are intended to 
help workers cope with job loss.  Others could be used to limit the negative effects of 
globalization on specific groups of workers and households.  These negative effects could 
include the potential decline in the earnings of unskilled workers, the reliance on child 
labor in export-oriented industries, and the increased volatility of employment and 
earnings potentially associated with terms-of-trade fluctuations and short-term capital 
movements.  Even if these negative effects do not materialize in the end, preparedness 
would be key to build support for economic reforms. 
  The most effective ways to mitigate the adverse effects of globalization are 
probably out of the labor market.  If exposure to international trade and foreign direct 
investment increases the returns to education, thus widening the earnings gap between 
skilled and unskilled workers, an effective education policy should be a priority.  Higher, 
and more evenly distributed levels of schooling would be key to ensure that the gains 
from globalization are widespread.  If international capital flows and the resulting 
macroeconomic fluctuations may lead to a substantial decline in the labor share of 
income, sound fiscal and financial policies should be a priority.  Minimizing the risk that 
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avoiding panic and herd behavior by foreign investors. 
But labor market policies are needed too, especially to mitigate the impact of job 
loss.  These policies can be classified in two groups: one-time interventions and 
permanent programs.  One-time interventions have been used in industrial countries to 
process the restructuring of declining industries, such as steel mills or shipyards.  In 
developing countries, they have been common in the context of public sector downsizing.  
Offering compensation and assistance to those bound to lose their jobs has been a way to 
defuse resistance to privatization, trade liberalization or market deregulation in industries 
where insiders are vocal and powerful.  Compensation of this sort can be criticized on the 
grounds that public sector workers are seldom poor, and tend not to fall in poverty in 
large numbers, even long after job separation.  Using scarce budget resources on them 
seems at odds with poverty alleviation efforts.  But the alternative to compensation could 
simply be lack of restructuring. 
  If they were perfectly designed, compensation packages for redundant workers 
would turn them indifferent to job loss, thus making economic reforms optimal in the 
sense of Pareto.  However, the experience suggests that the design of these packages is 
far from ideal.  Examples of over-compensation and under-compensation abound, 
sometimes within the same downsizing program.  Packages are often based on 
precedents, such as the number of years of salary, or of months of salary per year of 
service, offered in other countries or sectors.  A more sensible basis to assess the amount 
of compensation needed to achieve indifference is the analysis of microeconomic data on 
the earnings redundant workers could hope to make after separation.  This analysis is 
feasible in developing countries, and several methods can be used to compute the loss in 
benefits as well (Assaad, 1999; Chong and Rama, 2001a). 
  A downsizing program can be seen as an investment operation, with compensation 
packages and other related expenditures representing the up-front spending, and benefits 
being reaped over the years.  But some important costs and benefits can be hidden.  For 
instance, some analyses omit to consider among the costs of downsizing the unfunded 
liabilities created by early retirement programs.  More importantly, the distinction 
between financial returns and economic returns is often ignored.  The difference between 
the two can be substantial, as shown by a case study on the Algerian retrenchment 
program (Ruppert, 1999).  Financial returns compare costs and savings from the budget 
perspective, whereas economic returns measure the impact on aggregate output.  In 
particular, economic returns take into account the employment alternatives of retrenched 
workers.  Economic returns can be low when there are limited employment alternatives, 
as in the one-company town setting (Rama and Scott, 1999).  On the other hand, they 
could be very high when restructuring activities such as ports or telecommunications, 
whose inefficiency is a hindrance to other sectors. 
  As regards permanent programs to help workers cope with job loss, the most 
obvious example is unemployment insurance.  In fact, there are a growing number of 
voices calling for the set up of this program in middle-income developing countries.  This 
recommendation may surprise at a time when unemployment insurance is under fire in 
industrial countries, due to its adverse incentive effects.  Several studies have shown that 
long-lasting benefits encourage the unemployed to stay out of a job.  For this reason, 
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be part of the old-age pension system, especially when pension benefits depend on past 
contributions.  In this case, workers can add any unused savings to their old-age pension 
account, and “borrow” from their old-age pension entitlement in the event of job loss. 
In the case of developing countries, however, both the adverse incentive effects of 
unemployment insurance and the merits of individual savings accounts might be 
overstated.  When the informal sector is large, it is very difficult to monitor that the 
beneficiaries are really unemployed.  Therefore, unemployment benefits create an 
incentive to stay out of the formal sector while benefits last, not to stay out of a job.  As 
regards mandatory savings accounts, they do not involve any risk pooling: only a 
spreading of the earnings loss from unemployment over the life cycle.  If workers cannot 
“borrow” from their old-age pension account, and they do become unemployed when 
they are still young, they might not have enough resources to cope with job loss (unless 
the mandatory savings rate is very high).  On the other hand, if they can “borrow” 
substantially, they face an incentive to become unemployed, get as indebted as possible, 
and withdraw permanently from the formal sector to avoid repaying their debt. 
Another potential shortcoming of unemployment insurance and mandatory savings 
accounts programs is that they may not reach the poorest workers. Table 1 summarizes 
the findings of a comparative study on income support programs for the unemployed in 
Latin America (World Bank, 2000a).  This region has experienced with a variety of 
programs, and can be seen as a laboratory by other middle-income countries.  Table 1 
shows that very few, among the workers covered by unemployment insurance in Brazil 
and by mandatory savings accounts in Colombia, belong to the population group with the 
lowest earnings or consumption.  These two income support programs are well suited for 
workers in protected industries, who are usually enrolled with social security.  But the 
evidence discussed in the previous section indicates that many, among those who lose 
their jobs, come from the informal sector.  Unemployment insurance and mandatory 
savings accounts are not the appropriate programs to assist them. 
  At the other end of the spectrum, there are income support programs for the 
unemployed that do reach poor workers.  Public works, like the Maharastra employment 
guarantee scheme in India and the Trabajar program in Argentina, are among them 
(Ravallion, Datt and Chaudhuri, 1993, Datt and Ravallion, 1994, Jalan and Ravallion, 
1999).  Some training programs for the unemployed, like Probecat in Mexico, also fall in 
this category (Wodon and Minowa, 2001).  One common feature of these programs is 
that participants do not need to be enrolled in any social security program.  Another 
important feature is the self-selection of their participants.  Well-designed public works 
programs pay less than the average labor earnings of unskilled workers who do have a 
job.  As a result, only those really in need are willing to take them.  The income transfer 
offered by Probecat is low as well. 
The main difference between these programs is the nature of the activities the 
beneficiaries have to undertake.  In one case, they are requested to do physically 
demanding, full-time work.  In the other, they have to take full-time training.  The actual 
productivity of these activities is subject to debate, and the non-labor component of their 
cost can differ substantially.  But both kinds of programs seem well geared to help 
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belong to the poorest population groups. 
  In between these two extremes, mandatory severance pay is the most common 
income support program available to the unemployed in developing countries.  In this 
program, an employer is liable to pay a certain amount of money to a worker dismissed 
due to no fault of his or her own.  The amount is usually related to the last salary of the 
worker and his or her seniority in the job by a formula typically involving a minimum 
seniority and a maximum payment.  This program does not require the involvement of a 
social security agency.  Compliance is complaint-driven, which often overburdens labor 
inspectors but is probably cheaper than running a fully blown unemployment insurance 
program.  Mandatory severance pay makes the employer assume the role of an insurer.  
In the event that the firm goes bankrupt, workers usually have priority over other 
creditors to get their due. 
  One potential problem with mandatory severance pay is that it may discourage 
hiring.  This program raises separation costs in bad times, which can make employers 
reluctant to recruit in good times.  In its extreme form, mandatory severance pay becomes 
equivalent to lifetime job security.  In the cases of India and Zimbabwe, it has been 
claimed that lifetime job security reduces labor demand in the formal sector (Fallon and 
Lucas, 1991).  In a similar vein, a cross-country study by Heckman and Pagés (2000) 
shows a link between high separation costs and low employment-to-population ratios, at 
least for young workers.  However, this study reports much higher separation costs in 
Latin America than in Western Europe, which is to some extent surprising.  On the other 
hand, a study focusing on the change in earnings experienced by Peruvian workers as 
they move from jobs covered by severance pay to non-covered jobs, or vice-versa, 
suggests that workers may “pay” for coverage through lower wages (MacIsaac and 
Rama, 2001).  If part of the burden falls on workers, the adverse employment effect could 
be alleviated, or even offset.  Table 1 shows that mandatory severance pay, much the 
same as unemployment insurance, benefits mainly “middle-class” workers. 
  Finally, active labor market programs are often set up to help unemployed workers 
find new jobs.  Training, counseling, placement services, and assistance in job search, are 
among the most common examples.  While active labor market programs of this sort are 
quite popular with governments, trade unions and the general public, their payoffs seems 
limited.  For instance, Mexico’s Probecat appears to be effective at providing income 
support to the unemployed, but not at improving their earnings ability (Wodon and 
Minowa, 2000).  The effectiveness of these programs is difficult to assess, as participants 
are self-selected.  Workers who are more eager to succeed, or more able to learn, are 
more likely to participate.  It is therefore hard to disentangle the effects of the program 
from those of the ability of its participants.  In any event, the effects uncovered appear to 
be generally modest, and concentrated in relatively narrow subsets of participants 
(Fretwell et al., 1999; Gill et al., 2000). 
For some workers, the negative effect of globalization takes the form of a drop in 
earnings, rather than a job loss.  The minimum wage is a potential way to circumscribe 
this drop.  However, the actual impact of this intervention is often exaggerated.  To begin 
with, minimum wages are not directly relevant for the self-employed and those working 
in household industries.  In many developing countries, this group represents a majority 
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among those who may suffer from trade liberalization and deregulation earn substantially 
more than the minimum wage.  The latter might thus be ineffective in their case. 
Another important shortcoming of minimum wages in developing countries is the 
limited ability of governments to enforce them.  Several case studies show that 
compliance is partial at best, even in countries with a relatively high administrative 
capacity (Gindling and Terrell, 1995, and Maloney et al., 2001).  As a result, attempts to 
raise labor earnings through minimum wage hikes, as in Indonesia during the early 
1990s, have been quite ineffective (Rama, 2001c).  The flip side of weak enforcement is 
that the disemployment effects of minimum wages have been modest too.  In Mexico, the 
minimum wage is so low compared to the average wage of formal sector workers that its 
variation has no noticeable impact on employment.  In Colombia, where minimum wages 
are much higher, the estimated disemployment effects are about one tenth of those found 
in industrial countries (Bell, 1997). 
  The mere possibility that globalization increases the extent of child labor warrants a 
careful discussion of the policy alternatives.  However, to assess what could be done it is 
first necessary to understand why parents put their children to work.  The natural 
presumption in this respect is that parents love their children.  If they put them to work, it 
is probably because they have no better choice.  Under these circumstances, it is not clear 
that suppressing child labor (assuming it could be done) would improve the welfare of the 
children and their families.  A body of theoretical research has tried to identify the 
circumstances under which child labor is “inefficient”, meaning that loving parents fail to 
do what is better for their children, given the resources they have (Basu and Van, 1998; 
and Baland and Robinson, 2000).  Inefficiency arises when parents are constrained in 
credit markets, so that they cannot afford the education of their children, no matter how 
profitable. 
  Empirical research gives some support to this view.  Indicators of wealth, at the 
household level, are among the main determinants of child labor.  For instance, Grootaert 
and Patrinos (1999) study the relationship between child labor and household 
characteristics in four countries: Côte d’Ivoire, Colombia, Bolivia and the Philippines.  
The results are remarkably consistent across them, despite their vastly different social and 
cultural characteristics.  In a similar vein, Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) examine how 
school attendance responds to seasonal fluctuations in the income of agrarian households 
using panel data from rural India.  Their main finding is that seasonal fluctuations in 
school attendance are a form of self-insurance.  It would follow that the first-best 
response to child labor would be to correct the imperfections of credit markets (Cameron 
and Workswick, 1998; Ilahi, 1999).  But this may not be feasible. 
An alternative is to ban child labor.  This is a viable policy option for relatively 
small and well-identified sectors.  In particular, it should be forcefully pursued in the sex 
industry.  But the effectiveness of a ban across all sectors is more dubious.  The problem 
is the limited enforcement capacity of governments in developing countries.  In practice, 
a ban could only be implemented on formal sector firms; for example, those directly 
selling abroad.  This may result in children still working, but in the informal sector, with 
lower wages and possibly worse working conditions.  A partial ban could be welfare 
improving, but it could also backfire (Brown et al., 1998).  Admittedly, child labor bans 
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countries could be inspired to follow the same path.  However, other factors, such as 
rising incomes and technological change, might have been more important than the bans 
in reducing child labor (Nardinelli, 1980; Heywood, 1988). 
  From an economic point of view, it would be preferable to modify the incentives 
faced by households.  Some have considered raising the earnings of adult workers, 
through minimum wages (Basu, 1999).  The limited effectiveness of minimum wages in 
developing countries, discussed above, makes this an impractical alternative anyway.   
Most would prefer a cash stipend or a grant to poor families, conditional on school 
attendance.  Programs of this sort are already in place in several countries.  They include 
the Food for Education program in Bangladesh, Bolsa Escola in Brazil and Progresa in 
Mexico.  Similar programs are being set up on a pilot basis in Argentina, Colombia, 
Jamaica and Nicaragua, among others. 
  While subsidies could have a positive impact on school attendance, they may fail to 
eradicate child labor.  In India, it has been argued that the major deterrent for school 
participation is not the opportunity cost of not working, but low quality of the public 
education system.  Duraisamy (2000) reports that the majority of children not enrolled in 
school are actually not working.  An evaluation of the Food for Education program in 
Bangladesh shows that increased school enrollment did reduce child labor, although it 
also led to a considerable reduction in the children’s leisure time (Ravallion and Wodon, 
2000).  A similar conclusion was reached for the Progresa program in Mexico. 
  Last but not least, specific labor market policies could also be considered as a way 
to offset the effects of increased economic volatility.  Fiscal and financial policies alone 
may not be enough to cope with the impact of terms-of-trade fluctuations and short-term 
capital movements.  The potentially wider business cycles associated with globalization 
represent a form of uninsurable risk.  Rodrik (1998) claims that bigger governments, and 
especially bigger public sector employment, can be used as a substitute for insurance.  In 
support of his claim Rodrik shows that a positive correlation exists between an 
economy’s exposure to international trade and the size of its government.  This 
correlation holds for most measures of government spending, in low- as well as high-
income samples, and is robust to the inclusion of a wide range of controls.  In Rodrik’s 
view, the explanation is that government spending plays a risk-reducing role in 
economies exposed to a significant amount of external risk.  One piece of evidence in 
favor of this interpretation is that the relationship between openness and government 
spending is strongest when terms-of-trade risk is highest. 
  A similar correlation exists between government employment and openness 
(Rodrik, 1997).  A large number of “secure” jobs in the public sector could thus be seen 
as a form of insurance against the external risk faced by the economy, especially when 
those who hold those jobs transfer resources to their extended families.  But this 
interpretation is to some extent problematic.  While some public sector jobs might have 
been created with the deliberate goal of providing income security, other explanations are 
equally plausible.  Preliminary work with an expanded version of the database used by 
Rodrik suggests that the political regime, income inequality and the degree of ethno-
linguistic fractionalization are good predictors of the share of the labor force employed 
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sector could have detrimental effects on economic performance. 
7.  The Role of the International Community 
  Should something be done to encourage, or even force, developing countries to 
adopt specific labor market policies in the context of globalization?  Many in the 
industrial world would answer this question by a resounding “yes”.  The perception that 
long-time workers in protected industries or in the public sector lose their jobs, that the 
unskilled see their earnings fall, that children end up working in sweatshops, and 
households face higher economic instability, seems a strong enough justification for this 
affirmative answer.  But the next, obvious question is why is that developing countries 
fail to take the appropriate measures by themselves. 
  One possibility is that the governments of developing countries do not have a clear 
assessment of the costs and benefits of labor market policies.  Uncertainty would not be 
surprising, given that is an ideologically charged issue, even in industrial countries.   
While mostly everybody agrees that government interventions in the labor market lead to 
a trade-off between efficiency and equity, some downplay the efficiency costs while 
others claim that the equity gains are negligible.  From this perspective, an important role 
of the international community would be to assist in the identification and evaluation of 
these costs and benefits.  This is necessarily a long-term endeavor.  For most labor 
market policies, the evidence is still very limited.  Based on that evidence, however, the 
efficiency and equity implications of specific labor market policies can be substantially 
different. 
  On the efficiency side, a cross-country study of economic growth during periods of 
economic reform shows that some of the government interventions discussed in the 
previous section can lead to poor performance, while others are relatively benign (Forteza 
and Rama, 2001).  This study compared output rates across countries with different 
degrees of labor market “rigidity”.  The latter was measured based on an index that 
combines the level of minimum wages, the generosity of social security benefits, the 
membership of the labor movement, and the government share of the labor force.  The 
comparison was run over four periods: long before (i.e. ten to four years before) the 
launching of major economic reforms, short before, short after and long after.  The timing 
of reforms was identified based on the accumulated volume of World Bank lending for 
structural and sectoral adjustment programs. 
  The results of this cross-country study are summarized in figure 10.  The lines in 
this figure represent average growth rates for different groups of countries in the four 
phases of the reform process.  The results are similar when controls for past performance 
and external shocks are taken into account.  The figure suggests that labor market rigidity 
does not affect long-run performance, as the growth rates of all groups are almost 
identical long before the reforms.  But countries with rigid labor markets have a much 
worse economic performance in the years preceding the launching of the reforms, and a 
much slower recovery afterwards.  Interestingly, this pattern is not driven by minimum 
wages or mandated benefits but rather by unionization and, especially, by government 
employment. 
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interpretation of labor market rigidity.  The fact that minimum wages and mandated 
benefits do not matter much suggests that the problem is not the lack of adjustment of 
labor costs.  The regulatory framework promoted by the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) has a limited impact on performance as well.  If labor market 
“rigidity” is measured only by the number of ILO conventions ratified, there is no 
significant difference in performance across countries.  This result holds even when 
excluding industrial countries from the sample. 
Collective bargaining per se might not be to blame either.  If anything, the union 
wage premium is smaller in developing countries than in industrial countries.  It ranges 
from negligible in Senegal (Terrell and Svejnar, 1989) to small in Mexico (Panagides and 
Patrinos, 1994).  It has been argued that South Africa is an exception, in the sense that the 
union wage premium could be extraordinarily high in that country (Mwabu and Schultz, 
2000).  However, this high premium is likely to reflect self-selection, more than 
bargaining power.  An in-depth analysis of South African labor market data suggests that 
the wage premium is roughly the same as in the US (Butcher and Rose, 2001).  In fact, it 
is difficult to make the claim that collective bargaining is either “good” or “bad”.   
Whether the economic activities of trade unions are associated with a better or worse 
economic performance very much depends on the context they operate in (World Bank, 
1995, Aidt and Tzannatos, 2001). 
But trade unions also play a political role, in the sense that they can influence 
government policy decisions.  In developing countries, a large portion of the union 
membership is made of public sector employees.  Workers in protected industries tend to 
be unionized as well.  These two groups stand to lose from reforms such as trade 
liberalization, market deregulation, or privatization of state-owned enterprises.  The more 
powerful they are, the more likely that reforms will be delayed.  Once they are adopted, it 
is likely that they will be implemented half-heartedly.  Based on this political 
interpretation, figure 10 underscores the importance of dialogue with trade unions in the 
context of globalization, and understanding their grievances.  It also implies that the 
payoffs to the “compensation” of those who stand to lose from globalization, for instance 
through severance pay packages, can be large. 
On the benefits side, the same labor market interventions can be matched with 
indicators of inequality, such as the Gini index, or the income or consumption share of 
different population quintiles (Rama and Ravallion, 2001).  The analysis controls for 
other determinants of inequality, such as educational attainment, civil liberties, financial 
development and many others.  The results, summarized in Table 2, show that social 
protection policies like those usually run by social security agencies have a strong 
potential to reduce inequality.  The regulatory framework promoted by the ILO appears 
to have a similar impact, which is not surprising given the high correlation between the 
number of conventions ratified and the share of GDP devoted to social security.   
Collective bargaining seems less effective at reducing inequality.  Its impact is 
statistically significant only for the share of the second richest quintile of the population. 
All of the other labor market variables considered in Table 2 fail to reduce 
inequality significantly.  Based on the size of the estimated correlation coefficients, the 
number of “core” ILO conventions ratified by a country is totally ineffective.  “Core” 
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non-discrimination in the workplace, and freedom of association and the right to 
collective bargaining.  Some of these conventions are decades old, and have been ratified 
over the years by many countries, both industrial and developing.  More recently, all 175 
members of the International Labour Organisation endorsed core labor standards, as a 
result of their acceptance of the “Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work”.  As for other ILO conventions, whether “core” labor standards are enforced in 
practice is a different issue.   
Taken together, these results suggest that pushing developing countries to adopt 
“core” labor standards, or higher minimum wages, or to expand public sector 
employment, may not do much to neutralize the impact of globalization on workers.  The 
costs in terms of economic would be limited in the case of “core” labor standards and 
minimum wages, but they could be considerable in the case of public sector employment.  
The benefits in terms of reduced inequality would be small, if not negligible.  For the 
international community, a sounder approach is to promote the adoption of social 
protection programs, like the compensation packages and income support programs for 
the unemployed that were reviewed in the previous section.  The efficiency costs of 
social protection programs do not appear to be high.  But programs of this sort have the 
potential to reduce inequality, hence to offset the effects of globalization on returns to 
education and job losses.  If the main obstacle to the implementation of appropriate 
responses to globalization is lack of information, the international community should play 
a more active role in the in the assessment, and adjustment, of the labor market 
interventions that are already in place in those countries. 
  A related issue is whether the international community should try to apply some 
sort of sanctions or “conditionality” clauses on the adoption of specific labor market 
policies, or the implementation of specific social protection programs.  Political economy 
considerations provide an argument in favor of conditionality.  The households who are 
more likely to be negatively affected by globalization may not be appropriately 
represented in developing countries.  In particular, unskilled workers and those who have 
to put their children to work may have little say in policy decisions.  This possibility is of 
course a call for more democracy.  But as long as the latter is imperfect, lack of proper 
representation provides a rationale for attempts by the international community to 
influence the economic policies of developing countries in favor of the most vulnerable 
workers and their families. 
  Many in industrial countries would like to use trade sanctions to force developing 
countries to comply with specific labor standards.  One obvious argument against this 
approach is that it may open the door to hidden forms of protectionism, which could be 
more harmful to developing countries than the weakness of their labor market regulations 
(Brown et al., 1996, and Maskus, 1997).  Not surprisingly, developing countries perceive 
the entwining of these social issues with trade policy as a threat.  Moreover, linking trade 
sanctions and labor issues may lead to an erosion of the rules-based multilateral trading 
system (Anderson, 1997).  Others have proposed international agreements on core labor 
standards, with voluntary compliance (Golub, 1997; Moran, 2001).  And in fact, direct 
negotiations may not be needed for an efficient treatment of domestic labor standards 
within a trade agreement (Bagwell and Staiger, 1998). 
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conditionality, is related to the endogeneity of government interventions in the labor 
market.  Both these interventions and product market distortions (e.g. tariff barriers) 
reflect the uneven political power of different population groups.  In developing 
countries, employers and formal sector workers have more influence on government 
policies than workers in the informal sector or small farmers.  Employers and formal 
sector workers have a common interest in raising protective barriers, at the expense of 
those in the informal sector and in agriculture.  But the interests of employers and formal 
sector workers are opposed regarding labor market interventions, which are a mechanism 
to distribute the rents from protection.  These opposite interests may offset each other, 
leading to labor market interventions that are roughly second best (Rama and Tabellini, 
1998). 
  The analytical framework just described implies that the international community 
should use its leverage to reduce trade barriers, but refrain from imposing sanctions or 
using loan conditionality to affect labor market interventions, in one way or another.  
Reducing trade barriers is in the interest of the population groups that are not 
appropriately represented in the policy making process.  But to the extent that labor 
market interventions are second best, attempts to modify them from outside could be 
welfare reducing.  Moreover, the very endogeneity of economic policies implies that the 
pressure to reduce trade barriers should lead to a gradual adjustment of government 
interventions in the labor market. 
On the other hand, it is important to recognize that there is more than just disguised 
protectionism in the proposals to use sanctions or conditionality to promote specific labor 
market policies.  An analysis of support to a trade-linked child labor standard in the US 
revealed that districts where the population is more likely to be harmed by foreign 
competition was less supportive of this standard (Krueger, 1997).  Calls for action by 
industrial countries to enforce core labor standards around the world reflect, quite often, a 
genuine concern for workers in developing countries.  This concern can be used to 
promote market-based incentives, such as product labeling (Freeman, 1996).  Market-
based incentives rest on the fact that consumers in industrial countries are ready to pay a 
higher price for goods produced in compliance with labor standards.  Monitoring that 
they actually are is however difficult, and requires an active involvement of the civil 
society (Sabel et al., 2000). 
Genuine concern for the well-being of children in developing countries could also 
serve as a platform for a very active stance on pedophilia.  As for product labeling, the 
sanction would apply directly to those in industrial countries who engage in unacceptable 
behavior, not to the governments and populations of developing countries.  In the case of 
pedophilia, the governments of industrial countries could make their own citizens 
punishable for this crime, even if committed in the territory of a developing country.  
This threat could serve as a deterrent for one of the most hideous faces of globalization. 
8. Conclusion 
  This paper represents an attempt to provide a balanced view of the effects of 
globalization on employment and wages in developing countries, and to derive the 
implications for public policy.  This attempt is based on an analytical review of the 
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selective, implying that important pieces of evidence may have been omitted.  The claims 
made by most of the pieces that are reviewed could later be challenged, based on new 
evidence.  And there are entire areas where research is missing altogether.  For instance, 
the impact of globalization on informality has been barely addressed in this review.  With 
all these caveats in mind, the review attempted in this paper suggests that globalization 
can be good for most workers, provided that the appropriate economic policies are in 
place.  But it may not be good for all workers, and its distributional implications should 
not be ignored. 
  A first conclusion emerging from this review is that wages grow faster in 
economies that do integrate with the rest of the world.  Openness to trade can have a 
negative impact on wages in the short run, but it only takes a few years for this effect to 
change sign.  The impact of foreign direct investment is highly positive even in the short 
run, highlighting the importance of a good investment climate.  It follows that policies to 
integrate an economy with the rest of the world will be more beneficial to workers if they 
succeed in attracting investors from abroad.  The main threat to workers comes from 
international capital movements and the financial crises they can prompt.  These crises 
can lead to a durable decline in the labor share of income.  If they can be avoided, the 
long-term wage gains from globalization should more than offset the short-term losses, 
even assuming a very high time preference. 
  The benefits from globalization are not evenly distributed across workers, however.  
There is no evidence of an increase in the dispersion of wages by occupation.  But a 
variety of studies uncover an increase in the wage premium to skill, which contradicts the 
prediction of one of the most popular international trade models.  Disentangling whether 
this effect is actually due to trade, or rather to technology, or foreign ownership, is 
difficult.  If anything, foreign direct investment appears to have a stronger impact on the 
returns to education than openness to trade.  To the extent that poor workers have a 
limited educational attainment, they would not be the main beneficiaries from 
globalization.  On the positive side, openness to trade seems associated with a narrowing 
of the gender gap in earnings. 
  Globalization affects workers not only through wages, but also through 
employment.  Trade liberalization is associated with job losses in formerly protected 
sectors.  It is also associated with the replacement of permanent workers, who have a 
more privileged status, by temporary and casual workers, who enjoy fewer benefits.  The 
loss of “privileged” jobs is especially dramatic in the context of public sector downsizing.  
While the latter is not directly connected to globalization, the need to increase 
competitiveness often pushes governments to privatize state-owned enterprises, abolish 
legal monopolies in utilities, and retrench redundant civil servants.  But integration with 
world markets is also associated with substantial job creation, especially in export-
oriented activities such as textile, garments or footwear.  A large fraction of the newly 
created jobs is held by young women from rural areas.  These jobs may not be as good as 
the “privileged” jobs lost in protected industries and the public sector.  But for those 
young women they often represent an improvement over the alternatives.  Whether 
integration with world markets is associated with an increase in child labor remains an 
open issue.  Child labor is overwhelmingly the product of poverty, and most of it takes 
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But some of its most notorious manifestations are in activities that cater to consumers 
from industrial countries, such as rug exports and sexual tourism. 
  Because job destruction proceeds at a faster pace than job creation, integration with 
the rest of the world may be accompanied by many years of high unemployment rates.  
This pattern has been observed even among successful globalizers that could be 
considered as “models” in their own regions.  Overall, however, only a fraction of the 
unemployed in developing countries are out of a job due to globalization.  Queuing for 
“privileged” jobs, especially in the public sector, is common among the educated urban 
youth.  Among those unemployed who are not seeking their first job, many used to work 
in the informal sector, which is not directly affected by exposure to world markets.   
Moreover, unemployment rates do not appear to be systematically higher in more open 
economies. 
  The most important economic policies to offset the negative effects of globalization 
on workers do not operate directly through the labor market.  If exposure to international 
trade and foreign direct investment increase the wage premium to skill, access to 
education for all should be a priority.  If the financial crises prompted by international 
capital movements may lead to a durable decline in the labor share of income, good 
macroeconomic management and sound financial regulation are a must.  Still, some 
specific labor market policies and programs may be needed, especially to deal with job 
loss.  Developing countries have experience with a variety of income support programs 
for the unemployed, ranging from public works to mandatory severance pay to 
unemployment insurance.  As they differ in coverage, cost, incentive effects and ability to 
smooth consumption, these programs cannot be unambiguously ranked.  But some 
program or combination of programs may be suited to each developing country, 
depending on its characteristics.  One-time compensation programs can also be useful to 
cushion the impact of economic restructuring on specific groups of workers.  On the 
other hand, minimum wages and active labor market policies do not appear to be highly 
effective in developing countries. 
  The international community has a role to play in promoting the adoption of 
appropriate policies to protect workers from the negative effects of globalization.   
Regarding labor market policies, it can assist in the design of one-time compensation 
packages and more permanent income support programs to mitigate the consequences of 
job loss.  On the other hand, promoting “core” labor standards, higher minimum wages or 
bigger public sector employment may not do much to offset the impact of globalization.  
In the case of public sector employment it can lead to a poorer performance.  Finally, 
there is no strong rationale for the international community to act through sanctions or 
conditionality.  Trade sanctions, in particular, could indirectly penalize workers in 
developing countries.  Modifying the incentives faced by producers and consumers in 
industrial countries may be a more promising approach.  Because of its monitoring 
requirements, this approach requires a strong involvement of the civil society 
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Source: Based on work in progress by Freeman, Oostendorp and Rama (2001). Wages are measured in current US dollars, as averages 
across a common set of occupations, using data from Freeman and Oostendorp (2000). Countries are classified as non-globalizers, rich or 
globalizers as in Dollar and Kraay (2001). Wage data for the 1980s are from period 1983-1989, whereas wage data for the 1990s are for 
1990-1998.Figure 2 
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Source:  Based on work in progress by Freeman, Oostendorp and Rama (2001).  This figure reports the results of a regression 
explaining the log of wages, in PPP dollars, as a function of the trade-to-GDP ratio (based in dollar figures).  There is one 
observation per country, occupation and year, over period 1983-1998.  The regression includes fixed effects for all countries, 
occupations and years.  It also controls for the ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP.  Data on wages are from Freeman 
and Oostendorp (2000) and data on other variables from the World Bank. The solid line reflects the point estimate of the 
coefficient of interest.  The dotted lines indicate the 95 percent confidence interval. Figure 3
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Source: Based on work in progress by Freeman, Oostendorp and Rama (2001).  This figure reports the results of a regression explaining the log of wages, in 
PPP dollars, as a function of the ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP (based in dollar figures).  There is one wage observation per country, occupation 
and year, over period 1983-1998.  The regression includes fixed effects for all countries, occupations and years.  It also controls for the trade-to-GDP ratio.  
Data on wages are from Freeman and Oostendorp (2000) and data on other variables from the World Bank. The solid line reflects the point estimate of the 
coefficient of interest.  The dotted lines indicate the 95 percent confidence interval.Figure 4 
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Source:  The dispersion of wages by occupation was calculated using data from Freeman and Oostendorp (2000).  Data on the trade-
to-GDP ratio are from the World Bank. Figure 5 
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Source: Constructed using data gathered by Rama (2001b).Figure 6





















































Source: Based on Rama (2001b)Figure 7


























































Source: Constructed using data gathered by Madani (1999)Figure 8







































Source: Constructed data gathered by Rama and Artecona (2000).Figure 9 
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Source:  Average unemployment rates over five-year periods are from Rama and Artecona (2000).  Data on the trade-to-GDP ratio are 
from the World Bank.. 
 
Table 1 
Income Support Programs for the Unemployed 
 
Share of beneficiaries by earnings or consumption (%)   
Program and country 
Workers 
legally covered 
by the program 
Spending 
per benefi- 
ciary (US$)  
Cost of the 
program 
falls on  Poorest 2
nd poorest  Middle  2
nd richest  Richest 
Public works in 
Argentina 
 
























































































Notes: Constructed using data from World Bank (2000a). Figure 10 
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  Income or consumption share by quintile 






ILO conventions ratified  0.30 *  0.26 *  0.24 *  0.23 *  - 0.25 *  - 0.26 * 
Core ILO conventions ratified  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.06  - 0.03  - 0.01 
Minimum wage (% of average)  - 0.22  - 0.21  - 0.20  - 0.20  0.22  0.18 
S. sec. contribution (% of wage)  0.31  0.29  0.27  0.21  - 0.28  - 0.29 
S. sec. revenue (% of GDP)  0.32 *  0.33 *  0.30 *  0.26 *  - 0.31 *  - 0.33 * 
Days of paid maternity leave  0.22  0.18  0.12  0.09  - 0.06  - 0.05 
Union membership rate (%)  0.14  0.14  0.16  0.18  - 0.17  - 0.10 
Coverage of coll. Bargaining (%)  0.24  0.33  0.48  0.60 *  - 0.44  - 0.33 
Number of strikes and lock-outs  0.07  - 0.05  0.04  0.02  - 0.01  - 0.13 
General govt. (% of labor force)  0.13  0.14  0.14  0.13  - 0.12  - 0.12 
Govt. wage (% of average wage)  0.08  0.06  0.03  0.03  0.04  - 0.06 
 
Source:  Based on work in progress by Rama and Ravallion (2001). The figures reported in the table 
are correlation coefficients between “unexplained” inequality indicators and labor market 
policies.  Unexplained inequality is measured as the residual of a regression linking each 
inequality indicator with a large number of explanatory variables, none of which is directly 
related to the labor market.  The number of observations varies from cell to cell depending 
on data availability.  Significant correlation coefficients at the 10 percent level are indicated 
by an asterisk. 